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The Policeman's Duty and the Law
Pertaining to Citizen Encounters
CHARLES M. OBERLY III*
In this article the author, by case analysis, identifies the confusion facing
police officers when dealing with stop and frisk situations and suggests
adoption of the Model Rules of Stop and Frisk as a possible solution to the
problem.
I. INTRODUCTION
The issue of when police may make on the street stops has
been avoided by the United States Supreme Court for over twelve
years. This lack of specific guidance is particularly troublesome
to police officers who are charged with the responsibility of mak-
ing split-second decisions, which may prevent crimes from being
committed or result in the apprehension of those recently com-
mitting criminal acts.
The confusion in this area is demonstrated by such cases as
People v. Howard.' It is the purpose of this article to review the
opinions of the United States Supreme Court in this area and sug-
* By Charles M. Oberly III, Former Chief Prosecutor of the State of Dela-
ware; argued State v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979); B.A. Pennsylvania State Univer-
sity, 1968, Phi Beta Kappa; J.D. University of Virginia Law School 1971. Also
assisting in the preparation of this article was Joseph J. Longbardi III, a second
year law student at Delaware Law School.
1. People v. Howard, 50 N.Y.2d 583, 587, 408 N.E.2d 908, 911, 430, N.Y.S.2d 578,
581 (1980), cert. denied, 49 U.S.L.W. 3401 (1980).
gest the adoption of the Stop and Frisk Model Rules 2 as a possi-
ble solution to the confusion in the stop and frisk area.
II. CONFUSION DEMONSTRATED: HOWARD V. NEW YORK CITY
THE POLICEMAN'S DUTY AND THE LAW PERTAINING TO
CITIZEN ENCOUNTERS
While on patrol in an area of the Bronx in New York City, Of-
ficers Charles Hanley and Cornelius Brosnan of the New York
City Police Department observed William Howard crossing a
street. The time was approximately 1:00 p.m.; the area was one
plagued by a high incidence of burglaries. The officers, who were
in plain clothes and an unmarked vehicle, were attracted to How-
ard by the fact that he appeared to be carrying a woman's vanity
case. As the police car passed, Howard looked over his shoulder
in a "furtive" manner two or three times. 3 The officers then pul-
led the car over to the right side of the curb, at which time How-
ard reversed his direction and "walked to the west side of the
street and proceeded south on the sidewalk."
The police car then made a U-turn and the officers again ob-
served Howard looking in their direction. As the car approached,
Howard quickened his pace. The officers drove up to Howard and
Officer Brosnan, displaying his police identification, stated: "Po-
lice Officer, I would like to speak to you." 4 Howard looked di-
rectly at the officers, ignored them, and kept walking. The officers
then drove to an opening between parked cars where Brosnan re-
peated his earlier statement. As Brosnan began to exit the vehi-
cle, Howard ran away, clutching the vanity case to his chest.5
Confronted with a situation requiring an immediate decision,
officers Brosnan and Hailey made the reasonable decision to pur-
sue the fleeing suspect. Howard jumped an iron fence, ran down
an alleyway and into the basement of a building where he was
captured after failing to escape through a locked door and small
window. Prior to the capture, Howard took the vanity case and
threw it "into a pile of junk."6 The officers were directed to the
2. See Appendix.
3. 50 N.Y.2d at 587, 408 N.E.2d at 911, 430 N.Y.S.2d at 581.
4. Id. at 587, 408 N.E.2d at 911, 430 N.Y.S.2d at 581. At the time the police car
passed Howard he was walking across a street diagonally in a southeast direction.
Apparently the car then pulled ahead of Howard and was in front of him. Rather
than walk ahead and pass the police vehicle, Howard abruptly changed his course.
At this point, the police officers had done nothing more than observe Howard.
.5. Id. at 587, 408 N.E.2d at 911, 430 N.Y.S.2d at 581.
6. Id. at 587, 408 N.E.2d at 911, 430 N.Y.S.2d at 581. Howard's behavior was
suspicious and deserving of further investigation, because he was pursued by a
college freshman named Victor Dragaj, who actually captured Howard. Since the
officers were in plainclothes and in an unmarked vehicle, it is questionable
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vanity case by a third person who had seen Howard throw it
away.7 Upon opening the vanity, the officers discovered Howard's
source of concern. The case contained a .38 caliber revolver and a
quantity of heroin in glassine bags.
8
Howard's motion to suppress the evidence was initially granted
at the trial level. The trial judge concluded the "defendant's flight
could not escalate suspicion to anything more; even if a stop and
frisk was made permissible by the defendant's flight, the officers
went beyond the allowable scope of [New York law] 9 since (the)
defendant was no threat to the officers' safety."'10 Furthermore,
the trial judge concluded that the officers had no right to take pos-
session of the vanity case because it had not been abandoned and
was outside the "grabbable area.""
On appeal, the New York appellate division reversed the trial
judge on both the law and facts.' 2 Howard then pleaded guilty to
possession of a controlled substance. 13 Later, the New York
Supreme Court affirmed the conviction without an opinion.14 The
conviction was subsequently reversed by a four to three majority
whether Dragaj knew they were police officers. The opinion, however, is strangely
silent on Dragaj's role in the incident.
7. Id. at 587, 408 N.E.2d at 911, 430 N.Y.S.2d at 582.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 588, 408 N.E.2d at 911, 430 N.Y.S.2d at 582.
10. Id. "[W]here, as here, there is nothing to establish that a crime has been
or is being committed, flight, like refusal to answer, is an insufficient basis for
seizure or for the limited detention that is involved in pursuit." People v. Howard,
50 N.Y.2d at 588, 408 N.E.2d at 914, 430 N.Y.S.2d at 585 (citations omitted). See also
Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47 (1979) (where the Court held that there were no
grounds for a stop where the officers saw defendant and another man walk away
from each other in an alley in an area with a high incidence of drug traffic. There
was no indication, however, that it was unusual for people to be in the area and
the police had no supporting evidence for suspiciousness). See Sibron v. New
York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968) (the Court found that the officer could not reasonably be-
lieve he was in danger due to his observation of the defendant consorting with
narcotic addicts).
11. Id. at 592, 408 N.E.2d at 914, 430 N.Y.S.2d at 585. See also Adams v. Wil-
liams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972) (an officer must be entitled to make a stop and have rea-
sons to believe that the suspect is armed and dangerous in order to conduct a
weapon search limited to a protective purpose); Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40
(1968) (this case involved the search of a man observed consorting with narcotic
addicts, and there the Court found the officer had no reason to believe that Sibron
was armed and dangerous). See also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (the frisk
must be limited to that which is necessary for the discovery of weapons which
might be used to harm officers or others nearby).
12. People v. Howard, 65 A.D.2d 714, 411 N.Y.S.2d 12, 13 (1978).
13. 50 N.Y.2d at 584, 408 N.E.2d at 911, 430 N.Y.S.2d at 582.
14. People v. Howard, 72 A.D.2d 503, 420 N.Y.S.2d 526 (1979).
of the New York Court of Appeals, 15 which held that while the of-
ficers had sufficient basis to make an inquiry,16 Howard had a
right not to respond and could leave the scene free from any fur-
ther police investigation.17 In reaching this result, the majority
opined that the officers were only confronted by facts "susceptible
of innocent interpretation"' 8 which justified a limited right of in-
quiry and observation.19
In a bitter dissent, Justice Jasen, characterized the decision as
dealing "another serious and unjustifiable blow to effective law
enforcement." 20 Noting that Howard's actions evidenced an in-
tent to abandon the vanity case, the dissent concluded that the
police officers acted in a most reasonable manner.
21
With the United States Supreme Court having denied certio-
15. 50 N.Y.2d 583, 408 N.E.2d 908, 430 N.Y.S.2d 578 (1980).
16. On this point the Court stated:
We have no difficulty in concluding that the officers' request for infor-
mation from defendant was justified under those criteria. In an area beset
by a high burglary rate defendant was seen carrying a woman's vanity
case by the officers, one of whom testified that it was not uncommon for a
burglar to carry away loot in his victim's luggage. Considering those facts
together with defendant's numerous glances at the officers' car, his change
of direction and his quickened pace, we conclude that, though the carrying
by a man of a woman's purse does not constitute probable cause . . . and
though defendant could, the car being unmarked and the officers in plain-
clothes, have acted evasively out of fear for his own safety, the circum-
stances constituted a sufficient basis for the inquiry made, which of itself
constituted no more than a minor inconvenience to defendant ...
Id. at 584, 408 N.E.2d at 912, 430 N.Y.S.2d at 583 (citations omitted).
17. Id. at 590, 408 N.E.2d at 913, 430 N.Y.S.2d at 584. See Davis v. Mississippi,
394 U.S. 721, 727 n.6 (1969) (citizens cannot be compelled to answer questions upon
the request of officers); Illinois Migrant Council v. Pilliod, 398 F. Supp. 882, 889
(E.D. Ill. 1975), aff'd., 540 F.2d 1062 (7th Cir. 1976), aff'd in part on rehearing, 548
F.2d 715 (7th Cir. 1977); AMERICAN LAw INSTITUTE, A MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGN-
MENT PROCEDURE 275 (1975) [hereinafter cited as PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE).
18. Id. at 590, 408 N.E.2d at 913, 430 N.Y.S.2d at 583.
19. Id. The majority states: "The circumstances justified the inquiry made
and would have justified the officers in keeping defendant under observation . ..
but were not a predicate for anything more." Id. at 590, 408 N.E.2d at 913, 430
N.Y.S.2d at 583 (citations omitted). A reasonable assumption from this statement
would be that observation might lead the officers to heightened suspicion justify-
ing a further intrusion upon Howard's right to privacy. No indication is given as to
just what the officers might have permissibly observed. It is submitted that How-
ard's actions upon being approached by the police were inherently indicative that
criminal activity was afoot.
20. Id. at 594, 408 N.E.2d at 915, 430 N.Y.S.2d at 586 (Jasen J.; dissenting).
21. Id. Since even the majority fails to conclude that the officers did not act in
a reasonable manner, the "good faith" exception to the exclusionary rule may
have avoided this unfortunate decision. Sufficient probability, not certainty, is the
touchstone of reasonableness which governs the good faith exception. Theodor v.
Superior Court, 8 Cal. 3d 77, 561 P.2d 234, 104 Cal. Rptr. 226 (1972). See Hill v. Cali-
fornia, 401 U.S. 797 (1971) (the officers' mistake was understandable and the arrest
a reasonable response to the situation facing them at the time); Michigan v. DeFil-
lippo, 443 U.S. 31 (1979). See also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
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rari,22 Howard establishes standards for frisks in New York.
III. ELOCUTION OF STOP AND FRISK: TERRY V. OHIO
The United States Supreme Court's first foray into issues of po-
lice street stops began with Terry v. Ohio,23 in which the Court
addressed the narrow issue of "whether it is unreasonable for a
policeman to seize a person and subject him to a limited search
for weapons unless there is probable cause for arrest."24
The factual context of Terry v. Ohio is critical to understanding
its impact.25 Officer McFadden, a Cleveland police officer with
thirty-nine years experience, saw Terry and another man, Richard
Chilton, walk in front of a jewelry store and duck in to a nearby
alley approximately a dozen times. McFadden did not recognize
Terry, Chilton, or a third person who spoke with them for a few
moments, but McFadden approached the three men and asked
their names; their response was unintelligible. McFadden then
22. See note 1 supra. See also People v. Earl, 40 N.Y.2d 941, 358 N.E.2d 1037,
390 N.Y.S.2d 412 (1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 943 (1977), rehearing denied, 434 U.S.
881 (1978), where the Supreme Court denied certiorari in another bizarre opinion
from the New York Court of Appeals, which reversed an opinion from the New
York Supreme Court. In this case an off-duty New York policeman, riding home in
his car around midnight in New York City, observed two men crouched behind an
automobile in a partially deserted and unfenced hotel parking lot. The officer no-
ticed that one of the figures was holding something in his hand in a raised position
and the other appeared to place something in his back pocket. Believing some-
thing of a criminal nature was in the works, the officer decided to investigate. He
pulled up to where the men were and jumped from his car with his badge in one
hand and yelled "freeze." One of the men immediately dropped a loaded .38 cali-
ber revolver. They were arrested.
The New York Court of Appeals held the officer's actions to be illegal seizure.
While certiorari was denied, Chief Justice Burger and Justices Blackmun and
Rehnquist dissented. Acknowledging the Court cannot accept for review every
case brought before it, the dissenters suggested this decision was so clearly wrong
it could be summarily reversed. The strength of their conviction is set forth in
footnote 7 of the dissenting opinion:
Respondent suggests that '[o]f course, Officer Carter, like any other citi-
zen, would have had the right to satisfy his curiosity by addressing ques-
tions to defendant ... .' [Response to petition for certiorari, at 6.1
Of course, no citizen or policeman in his right mind would have ap-
proached respondent and his companion as he would a tourist in Times
Square at high noon merely to satisfy idle curiosity. Officer Carter, unlike
ordinary citizens, had a sworn duty to investigate such suspicious behav-
ior, and was acting pursuant to such duty when he approached the sus-
pects. His conduct should be commended, not reproached.
431 U.S. at 948 n.7 (Burger, C.J.; dissenting).
23. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
24. Id. at 15.
25. Id. at 6.
grabbed Terry, spun him around, and while conducting a pat-
down search 26 of his clothing found a .38 caliber revolver. A simi-
lar pat-down search of Chilton also produced a revolver. Nothing
was found on the third person, Katz. 27
In upholding the actions of McFadden, the Supreme Court con-
cluded that Terry had been seized when frisked by broadly stat-
ing: "It must be recognized that whenever a police officer accosts
an individual and restrains his freedom to walk away, he has
'seized' that person."28 The broad statement was clarified in a
subsequent footnote which states:
We thus decide nothing today concerning the constitutional propriety of
an investigative "seizure" upon less than probable cause for purposes of
"detention" and/or interrogation. Obviously not all personal intercourse
between policemen and citizens involves "seizures" of persons. Only
when the officer, by means of physical force or show of authority has in
some way restrained the liberty of a citizen may we conclude that a
"seizure" has occurred. We cannot tell with any certainty upon this rec-
ord whether any such "seizure" took place here prior to Officer McFad-
den's initiation of physical contact for purposes of searching Terry for
weapons and we thus may assume that up to that point no intrusion upon
constitutionally protected rights had occurred.2 9
The question whether Terry was seized when first approached
by Officer McFadden was left unanswered in the Court's opinion.
The majority appears to imply that no "seizure" occurred until
the officer physically placed his hands on Terry.30 Recognizing
the gap left by the majority opinion, Justice Harlan attempted to
address the issue by indicating that officer McFadden had cause
to seize Terry when he first approached the three men. Absent
cause to seize, the person addressed by a police officer has the
right to ignore his interrogator and walk away.31
Justice White, concurring in the opinion, similarly noted that
not every police-citizen encounter is proscribed by the fourth
amendment.
There is nothing in the Constitution which prevents a policeman from ad-
26. Id. at 7. Assuming that the detention is proper, the right to search is ini-
tially limited to a frisk which consists of running the hands over the outer surface
of the suspect's clothing for the limited purpose of determining if he is armed.
27. Id. at 7.
28. Id. at 16.
29. Id. at 19 n.16. See also Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 61 n.20 (1968).
30. Thus, when Officer McFadden approached the three men gathered
before the display window at Zucker's store he had observed enough to
make it quite reasonable to fear that they were armed; and nothing in
their response to his hailing them, identifying himself as a police officer,
and asking their names served to dispel that reasonable belief. We cannot
say his decision at that point to seize Terry and pat his clothing for weap-
ons was the product of a volatile or inventive imagination, or was under-
taken simply as an act of harassment. ...
Id. at 28 (emphasis added).
31. Id. at 32-33 (Harlan, J.; concurring).
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dressing questions to anyone on the streets. Absent special circum-
stances, the person approached may not be detained or frisked but may
refuse to cooperate and go on his own way. However, given the proper cir-
cumstances, such as those in this case, it seems to me the person may be
briefly detained against his will while pertinent questions are directed to
him. Of course, the person stopped is not obliged to answer, answers may
not be compelled, and refusal to answer furnishes no basis for an arrest,
although it may alert the officers to the need for continued observation.
3 2
Although the opinion left undecided the point at which a police-
citizen encounter activates the protection of the fourth amend-
ment against unreasonable search and seizure, the Court found
that Officer McFadden was able to point to "specific and articul-
able facts which, taken together with rational inferences from
those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion."33 The intrusion
warrants a protective search for weapons "where he has reason to
believe he is dealing with an armed and dangerous individual,"34
an unassailed fact in Terry since Officer McFadden believed the
defendant was casing the store for a possible robbery. Terry,
therefore, stands for the proposition that if a police officer be-
lieves, based upon specific and articulable facts warranting the in-
trusion, that criminal activity may be afoot, and he is dealing with
an armed person, the officer may subject that person to a seizure
for the purpose of a pat-down search or frisk.35
In reaching its decision in Terry, the Court balanced the gov-
ernmental interest of the need to search against the invasion en-
tailed by the seizure.3 6 The interest of society was seen as clearly
paramount, when the Court stated that it would have been poor
police work for Officer McFadden not to further investigate. 37 Be-
cause of the possible threat to an officer's physical safety, "it
would appear to be clearly unreasonable to deny the officer the
power to take necessary measures to determine whether the per-
son is in fact carrying a weapon."38
32. Id. at 34 (White, J.; concurring).
33. Id. at 21 (two men pacing along a street corner for an extended period of
time, pausing to stare in the same store window roughly 24 times, followed by con-
ferences in which a third man later joined them, constituted specific and articul-
able facts).
34. Id. at 27.
35. Id. at 30-31.
36. Id. at 21. See Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 534-37 (1967).
37. Id. at 23: "It would have been poor police work indeed for an officer of 30
years experience in the detection of thievery from stores in this same neighbor-
hood to have failed to investigate this behavior further."
38. Id. at 24. See also Id. at 24 n.21, in which the Court cites figures showing
that from 1960 through 1966, a total of 335 police officers were killed in the line of
The same day that Terry was decided, the Court handed down
the opinions of Sibron v. New York39 and Peters v. New York,40
each addressing a factually different twist from Terry.
In Sibron, Brooklyn patrolman Anthony Martin, while patrol-
ling his beat in uniform on March 9, 1965, observed Sibron contin-
ually from the hours of 4:00 p.m. to 12:00 midnight. During this
period, Officer Martin saw Sibron converse with six or eight per-
sons whom Martin knew were narcotic addicts. The officer did
not overhear any of the conversations and did not observe any ob-
ject pass between Sibron and the others. Later that evening,
Sibron was seen speaking to three other known addicts inside a
restaurant where he ordered a piece of pie and coffee. 4 1 Officer
Martin approached Sibron while he was seated and requested
him to come outside. Once outside the restaurant, the officer ad-
dressed Sibron, stating, "you know what I am after." Sibron
mumbled something and as he began to reach into his pocket,
Martin thrust his hand into Sibron's pocket and removed several
glassine envelopes containing heroin.42 Sibron's conviction for
possession of heroin was upheld on appeal by all New York
courts hearing the case.43 Relying upon the Terry decision, the
United States Supreme Court reversed the conviction, finding
nothing in Sibron's behavior giving rise "to particular facts from
which he (Officer Martin) reasonably inferred that the individual
was armed and dangerous." 44
In reaching the Sibron decision, the Court again limited its
scope of review to whether or not the officer had the right to seize
and frisk Sibron for weapons.45 The Court went on to state that
duty. This carnage has greatly increased since the Terry opinion. In the five year
period from 1969 through 1973, some 565 police officers were killed. From 1974
through 1978, the figure was 558 police officers. Over the ten year span after Terry,
an average of 112.3 police officers have died yearly while attempting to protect the
public. In 1966, only 57 law enforcement officers lost their lives in the line of duty.
Similarly in 1966, the number of assaults on police officers was 23,851. By 1978, this
figure had mushroomed to 56,130. See U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, FEDERAL BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES 300, 307-08
(1978).
39. 392 U.S. 40 (1968).
40. Id. at 40.
41. Id. at 45.
42. Id. The arrest of Sibron and Peters was made pursuant to New York's
"stop and frisk" law, N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAw § 180-a (McKinney 1980). The deci-
sions, however, were not premised on the constitutional validity of the statute. Id.
at 45, 60 n.20.
43. Id. at 40-41.
44. Id. at 64.
45. We are not called upon to decide in this case whether there was a
"seizure" of Sibron inside the restaurant antecedent to the physical
seizure which accompanied the search. The record is unclear with respect
to what transpired between Sibron and the officer inside the restaurant. It
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even assuming such cause existed, the search went too far be-
cause Terry only sanctioned pat-downs and did not include reach-
ing into pockets 46 prior to finding or knowing the location of a
weapon.
The final decision in the June 10, 1968, triology was Peters v.
New York, 47 which also arose in the context of New York's stop
and frisk law. 48 The stated facts show that on July 10, 1964, Officer
Samuel Lasky of the New York City Police Department was home
in his apartment at approximately 1:00 p.m. Lasky heard a noise
at the door of his apartment, but as he approached it, the tele-
phone rang and he took the call. Following the conclusion of the
conversation, Lasky peered through the peephole in his door and
observed two unfamiliar men "tiptoeing out of the alcove toward
the stairway."49 Lasky called the police, and then he dressed in
civilian clothes and armed himself with his service revolver. As
he exited his apartment, Lasky slammed the door behind him.
"This precipitated a flight down the stairs on the part of the two
men, and Officer Lasky gave chase."50 Defendant Peters was
is totally barren of any indication whether Sibron accompanied Patrolman
Martin outside in submission to a show of force or authority which left
him no choice, or whether he went voluntarily in a spirit of cooperation
with the officer's investigation.
Id. at 63.
46. Id. at 65.
47. Id. at 40. This was a companion case decided with Sibron.
48. The Supreme Court notes that the New York Court of Appeals justified the
search based on N.Y. CRM. PROC. LAW § 180-a (McKinney 1980); this is New York's
"stop and frisk law." Id. at 40. The law at that time provided that "a police officer
may stop any person abroad in a public place whom he reasonably suspects is
committing... [certain crimes] and may demand ... his name, address and an
explanation of his actions, [and when the officer] suspects he is in danger ... he
may search such person for a dangerous weapon." N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 180-a
(McKinney 1980). This statute has since been amended to N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW
§ 140.50 (McKinney Supp. 1980). The statute now provides, in part, that "a police
officer may stop a person in a public place located within the geographical area of
such officer's employment when he reasonably suspects that such person is com-
mitting, has committed, or is about to commit ... a felony or misdemeanor." Id.
at § 140.50(1) (emphasis added). See also People v. Arthurs, 24 N.Y.2d 688, 249
N.E.2d 462, 301 N.Y.S.2d 614 (1969) (a police officer who reasonably believes that
he is dealing with an armed and dangerous individual may make a reasonable
search for weapons, even though he does not have probable cause for arrest or if
he's not certain the individual is armed); People v. Hoffman, 24 A.D.2d 497, 261
N.Y.S.2d 651 (1965) (a police officer has the authority to stop and question a per-
son as the result of their suspicious activities in the operation of an automobile at
4 a.m.).
49. 392 U.S. at 48.
50. Id. at 49.
physically apprehended one floor below by Lasky, who grabbed
him by the collar. The second man successfully avoided capture.
After being seized, Peters attempted to explain his presence and
behavior by claiming he was visiting an unnamed married wo-
man. Unconvinced of the truthfulness of Peters' reason for being
in the building, Officer Lasky frisked Peters and found a hard ob-
ject in the pocket of his pants. Believing that the object might be
a knife, Lasky removed it and discovered an "opaque plastic en-
velope, containing burglar's tools".51
Peters was tried and "convicted of possessing burglary tools
under circumstances evincing an intent to employ them in the
commission of a crime. '5 2 The United States Supreme Court af-
firmed the conviction on grounds other than theories of stop and
frisk.53 Chief Justice Warren, speaking for the majority, con-
cluded that Officer Lasky's search was permissible as being inci-
dent to a lawful arrest.5 4 In so holding, the Court stated: "It is
difficult to conceive of stronger grounds for an arrest short of ac-
tual eyewitness observation of criminal activity."55
As he did in the Terry decision, Justice Harlan squarely met the
issue presented. Stripped to bare essentials, Justice Harlan be-
lieved it clear that Officer Lasky possessed only a strong suspi-
cion that Peters and his associate were engaged in illegal activity.
The officer believed he heard a noise at his door, but engaged in a
telephone conversation before investigating. He did not see ei-
ther man holding implements or attempting to manipulate any
locks. The suspects were evidently not masked or dressed in any
51. Id.
52. Id. at 48.
53. Id. at 67.
54. Id. The Court noted that "a search incident to a lawful arrest may not pre-
cede the arrest and serve as part of its justification." Id. at 67. The issue, then,
concerns when the lawful arrest took place, and whether or not the search came
before or after the lawful arrest. The Court reasoned that the arrest took place
"[wIhen the policeman grabbed Peters by the collar, he abruptly 'seized' him and
curtailed his freedom of movement on the basis of probable cause to believe that
he was engaged in criminal activity." Id. Thus, the search came after this lawful
arrest.
55. Id. at 66. It is interesting to note the following observation of the Chief
Justice:
As the trial court explicitly recognized, deliberately furtive actions and
flight at the approach of strangers or law officers are strong indicia of mens
rea, and when coupled with specific knowledge on the part of the officer
relating the suspect to the evidence of crime, they are proper factors to be
considered in the decision to make an arrest.
Id. (citations omitted).
Except for the fact that Peter's purported offense was to take place inside an
apartment building and had yet to be completed, it is submitted that Peters is in-
distinguishable from the Howard case where the officers there had as much prob-
able cause as the officer on patrol. Intellectual distinctions between the quantum
of evidence facing the officers in Howard and Peters are best left in the classroom.
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peculiar fashion, but they were "tiptoeing" and fled at the slam of
a door. Rather than avoiding the critical issue by finding probable
cause to arrest existed, Justice Harlan explicitly stated there was
no probable cause to arrest, but there were articulable circum-
stances.5 6 Furthermore, Justice Harlan stated that the Court
should "take into account a police officer's trained instinctive
judgment operating on a multitude of small gestures and actions
impossible to reconstruct."5 7
While Terry, Sibron, and Peters are helpful in setting the pa-
rameters as to when a police officer may physically intrude upon
one's person,58 they serve as little guidance when the scope of an
investigative stop falls short of a pat-down search or arrest.5 9
Over the next six years, the Court did little to ameliorate the
problems confronting policemen on the beat. In 1969, the Court in
Davis v. Mississippi,60 struck down the rape conviction of a Negro
youth whose fingerprints were obtained through a dragnet ar-
rest 6' of numerous black youths in Meridian, Mississippi for the
purpose of investigation. In reversing the conviction, the Court
further opined that the fourth amendment protections apply dur-
ing the investigatory stage of a case insofar as the mass arrest of
innocent people is concerned. Yet, as in Sibron, the Court re-
56. "I do not think that Officer Lasky had anything close to probable cause to
arrest Peters before he recovered the burglar's tools. Indeed, if probable cause ex-
isted here, I find it difficult to see why a different rationale was necessary to sup-
port the stop and frisk in Terry. . . ." 392 U.S. at 74 (Harlan, J.; concurring).
57. Id. at 78. See also LaFave, "Street Encounters" and the Constitution: Terry,
Sibron, Peters, and Beyond, 67 MICH. L. REV. 39, 63 (1968).
58. If a police officer observes unusual conduct, which in light of his experi-
ence leads him to believe criminal activity has been or will be committed, he may
conduct a limited search of the outer clothing for weapons if he believes the per-
son is armed and dangerous in order to protect himself and others. 392 U.S. at 30.
59. In his concurring opinion, Justice Harlan seemingly approves of the PRE-
ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE, supra note 17. 392 U.S. at 71 n.1. These procedures
state that only a judicial official may issue a warrant, an application describing
with particularity the individuals and places to be searched may only be made by
a prosecuting attorney. If the affidavit is based on hearsay, the informant's relia-
bility must be set forth. The official acting on the application may call witnesses to
aid him in coming to a decision. When a warrant is issued, it must state with par-
ticularity the identity of the issuing authority, the identity of the applicant and all
persons whose affidavits were given in support, the finding of sufficiency of the ap-
plication, the name of the person to be searched or the location of the place to be
searched, and when the warrant may be executed. PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE,
supra note 17, at 87-105.
60. 394 U.S. 721 (1969).
61. Id. at 726-27. The Court construed the "investigatory detentions" of this
case to be arrests.
ferred to the fact that there was no evidence that the defendant
voluntarily accompanied the police to the station.62 Once again
the concept of "voluntary cooperation" was alluded to but re-
served for another time.63
In the 197264 case of Adams v. Williams,65 the Supreme Court
was again called upon to judge the conduct of a police officer who
reasonably believed he was dealing with an armed suspect. Po-
lice Sgt. John Connolly was patrolling a high-crime area in Bridg-
eport, Connecticut when he was approached at approximately 2:15
a.m. by a person known to him.66 The informant related "that an
individual, seated in a nearby vehicle, was carrying narcotics and
had a gun at his waist." 67 The officer radioed for assistance and
approached Williams' car. He tapped on the window and asked
Williams to open the door. Instead, Williams rolled down the win-
dow. Making a split-second decision, Sgt. Connolly reached
through the window and removed a fully loaded revolver from
Williams' waistband; the precise spot the informant said the gun
62. Id. at 726.
63. The issue of voluntary cooperation was addressed in United States v. Men-
denhall, 100 S. Ct. 1870 (1980). It was stated that if a person voluntarily consents
to a search, the requirements of a warrant and probable cause are not needed.
The important issue in such a case then becomes whether or not the cooperation
was voluntary, i.e., free of duress, threats, or unlawful detention. See also note 45
supra.
64. It is interesting to note at this point the rarely cited opinion of Palmer v.
City of Euclid, 402 U.S. 554 (1971), where the Court in a per curiam opinion struck
down an ordinance of the town of Euclid, Ohio, that permitted the arrest of suspi-
cious persons. The statute was ruled to be unconstitutionally vague. The facts
and the concurring comments of Justice Douglas were noteworthy.
Palmer was observed late at night in a parking lot. A female passenger in
Palmer's car exited and entered an adjoining apartment house. Palmer then pul-
led onto the street, parked his vehicle with its lights on, and began to use a two-
way radio. He'was approached by a police officer and was arrested after he gave
three different addresses for himself and could not identify his female associate.
Palmer was not armed. Id. at 545.
While agreeing the statute was void, Justice Stewart offered the following obser-
vation in which Justice Douglas joined.
A policeman has a duty to investigate suspicious circumstances, and the
circumstances of a person wandering the streets late at night without ap-
parent lawful business may often present the occasion for police inquiry.
But in my view government does not have constitutional power to make
that circumstance, without more, a criminal offense.
Id. at 546 (Stewart, J.; concurring).
It is submitted that this view is in accord with Douglas' apparent belief that, short
of intruding upon a person's physical being, the police do have a duty to confront
and possibly freeze a situation pending further inquiry. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 35
n.1 (Douglas, J.; dissenting).
65. 407 U.S. 143 (1972).
66. Id. at 144. The informant was personally known to the officer and had pro-
vided him with information in the past. This factual situation was contrasted with
that of the anonymous informant.
67. Id. at 145.
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would be located. Williams was placed under arrest. A search of
Williams and the vehicle uncovered substantial quantities of her-
oin, a machete, and a second revolver.6 8
The seizure of the weapon was upheld in an opinion authored
by Justice Rehnquist.6 9 Adding to Terry's ambiguous stance on
the initial approach by Officer McFadden, Justice Rehnquist was
more specific, stating: "A brief stop of a suspicious individual, in
order to determine his identity or to maintain the status quo mo-
mentarily while obtaining more information, may be most reason-
able in light of the facts known to the officer at the time."70
The majority opinion, however, did not squarely decide whether
the fourth amendment is applicable to the initial stop.71 Rather,
the opinion approaches the problem by concluding that "[t] he
Fourth Amendment does not require a policeman who lacks prob-
able cause to arrest to simply shrug his shoulders and allow a
crime to occur or a criminal to escape."72 As in Terry, the Court
applied a balancing test,73 and specifically referred to the inci-
dence of violence directed towards police officers, especially from
guns.7 4
68. Id.
69. "[U]nder the circumstances surrounding Williams' possession of the gun
seized by Sgt. Connolly, the arrest on the weapons charge was supported by prob-
able cause, and the search of his person and of the car incident to that arrest was
lawful." Id. at 149.
70. Id. at 146 (citations omitted).
71. The specter of voluntary cooperation is raised once again, but since the pe-
titioner did not contend that Williams rolled down the window voluntarily, the is-
sue was avoided. Id. at 146 n.1, 151 (Brennan, J.; dissenting). See notes 45 and 63
supra.
72. 407 U.S. at 145.
73. The Court in Terry, quoting Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 534-
35, 536-37 (1967), said that it is necessary "'first to focus upon the governmental
interest which allegedly justifies official intrusion upon the constitutionally pro-
tected interests of the private citizen,' for there is 'no ready test for determining
reasonableness other than by balancing the need to search (or seize) against the
invasion which the search (or seizure) entails.'" 392 U.S. at 20-21. The Court
notes the governmental interests involved in the balancing approach: Effective
crime prevention, detection, and the need for law enforcement officers to protect
themselves and others, id. at 22; as opposed to the "nature and quality of the in-
trusion on individual rights which... constitutes a severe, though brief, intrusion
upon cherished personal security, and. . . [is] an annoying, frightening, and per-
haps humiliating experience." Id. at 24-25.
74. 407 U.S. at 146-48 n.3, which noted that 125 policemen were murdered in
1971, that all but five were killed by gunshot wounds, and that approximately 30%
of police shootings occur when an officer approaches someone in a car. See note
38 supra.
Justices Douglas, Marshall, and Brennan dissented.75 Justice
Brennan believed that the holding of Terry should not be ex-
tended to possessory offenses. 7 6 Justices Marshall and Douglas
felt the informant's information was devoid of factual support per-
mitting the intrusion sanctioned by the opinion and, even assum-
ing there was reason to believe Williams was armed, Connecticut
law allows people to carry guns with a permit. Officer Connolly
had no knowledge the gun was being unlawfully carried.7 7
What little can be gleaned from the Court's opinions in Terry,
Sibron, Peters, and Adams, is the recognition of the need to pre-
vent crime, particularly those crimes carrying the potential of
physical violence.78 Application of the balancing test suggested in
Terry certainly favors an approach having cognizance of the po-
lice officer's duty to prevent crime as well as to solve crime.7 9
Taking into account the seriousness of the offense does not require the
use of some finespun theory whereby each offense in the criminal code
has its own probable cause standard; rather, it involves only the common-
sense notion that murder, rape, armed robbery, and the like call for a
somewhat different police response than, say, gambling, prostitution, or
possession of narcotics. 8 0
Nevertheless, the opinions, excepting Peters in which probable
cause for arrest was found to exist, avoid deciding when a law en-
forcement officer may stop someone to inquire into suspicious be-
havior. The Court has not decided whether such inquiry invokes
the full protections of the fourth amendment, 81 or whether the
75. Id. at 149 (Douglas, Marshall, J.J.; dissenting), 151 (Brennan, J.; dissent-
ing).
76. Id. at 151-53. While not mentioned by Justice Brennan, this is the recom-
mended approach proposed by the American Law Institute's PRE-ARRAIGNMENT
PROCEDURE, supra note 17, at 5-6, Commentary at 263.
77. Justice Marshall, dissenting, claimed that the frisk was illegal under Terry.
Due to Connecticut law, there was no reason for the officer to believe the person
was dangerous. Justice Marshall states that Terry only produces a very narrow
exception to a search without a warrant and that this case did not fall into that
exception. The officer had no specific facts other than what the informant told him
to suggest illegal activity. 407 U.S. at 159-60.
78. "Indeed, a comparison of Terry and Sibron reveals that the Court was un-
doubtedly influenced by the nature of the crimes involved in these two cases."
LaFave, supra note 57, at 58.
79. 392 U.S. at 22 (the Court noted the governmental interest in preventing
and detecting crime).
80. LaFave, supra note 57, at 57. See also 3 W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE
97 (1978).
81. It might be argued that Justice Rehnquist's words in Adams concerning
brief stops effectively set forth the applicable test. He stated that "[a] brief stop
of a suspicious individual, in order to determine his identity or to maintain the sta-
tus quo momentarily while obtaining more information, may be most reasonable
in light of the facts known to the officer at the time." 407 U.S. at 146 (citations
omitted). However, that dictum suggesting a maintenance of the status quo has
yet to be elevated to law and Adams cannot be read any broader than the facts
presented.
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Amendment is even applicable where there is not a physical
touching.82
IV. STOPS IN BORDER PATROL CASES
After a two year silence,83 the Supreme Court again ventured
into the murky waters of non-arrest stops in the case of United
States v. Brignoni-Ponce.84 The case involved two roving border
patrol officers who were observing northbound traffic in the vicin-
ity of a fixed checkpoint in California that was closed because of
inclement weather. The patrol car's headlights were used to illu-
minate passing vehicles. When the car in question passed, the of-
ficers decided to pursue and stop it because the occupants
appeared to be of Mexican descent. Upon stopping the vehicle,
the officers learned the occupants were illegal aliens. 85 The trial
court refused to suppress testimony concerning the stop.86 The
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, however, disagreed and ruled the
stop illegal.87 The United States Supreme Court affirmed, empha-
sizing the need for some minimal restraints upon the unfettered
interference with the right of citizens to use the highways. 88 Cit-
ing Terry, the Court held that if an "officer's observations lead
him reasonably to suspect that a particular vehicle may contain
aliens who are illegally in the country, he may stop the car briefly
and investigate the circumstances that provoke suspicion."8 9 The
Court stated that the determination of reasonableness was made
82. While being largely ignored by the Supreme Court, the problem generated
considerable discussion and proposals. See PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE, supra
note 17. This report was in its fifth draft in 1972 and was finally completed in 1975;
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, THE
ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE (1974); L. TIFFANY, D. MCINTYRE, & D. ROTEN-
BERG, DETECTION OF CRIME (1967) [hereinafter cited as TIFFANY]; THE INTERNA-
TIONAL ASSOCIATION OF CHIEFS OF POLICE, RESEARCH DIVISION'S MODEL "STOP AND
FRISK" ORDINANCE AND COMMENTARY (1972); U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, NATIONAL DIS-
TRICT ATrORNEY'S ASSOCIATION, MANUAL ON THE LAW OF SEARCH AND SEIZURE (rev.
ed. 1972); ARIZONA STATE UNIVERSITY, COLLEGE OF LAW, PROJECT ON LAW ENFORCE-
MENT POLICY AND RULE MAKING, MODEL RULES OF STOP AND FRISK (1974).
83. In 1973, the Court decided Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266
(1973), striking down the use of roving border patrols to search vehicles without a
warrant or probable cause at points removed from the border or its functional
equivalents.
84. 422 U.S. 873 (1975).
85. Id. at 874-75.
86. Id. at 875.
87. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 499 F.2d 1109 (9th Cir. 1974).
88. 422 U.S. at 882-83.
89. Id. at 881.
to depend upon "specific articulable facts, together with rational
inferences from those facts, that reasonably warrant suspicion
that the vehicles contain aliens who may be illegally in the coun-
try."
90
Keenly aware of the existence of a severe problem involving il-
legal aliens, the Court carefully attempted to delineate what
might suffice as reasonable suspicion. Included among the possi-
ble criteria are "obvious attempts to evade officers," and attempts
to "hide."91 That the standard for determining reasonableness is
less than onerous can scarcely be argued.
One term later, the Court considered another border patrol
case. In United States v. Martinez-Fuerte,92 the use of permanent
checkpoints came under scrutiny. Reversing the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals 93 and affirming a decision from the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals, 94 the Court, in an opinion by Justice. Powell, up-
held the use of fixed checkpoints for the visual screening or ques-
tioning of all occupants of vehicles, even though there is no
reason to believe that a particular vehicle contains illegal aliens.95
Further, it is constitutionally permissible to refer some of the
stopped motorists to a secondary inspection area for questions re-
garding citizenship and immigration status, even though many re-
ferrals are made solely on the basis of apparent Mexican
ancestry.96
Balancing the public interest in restricting the flow of illegal
aliens against the brief inconvenience of the stop and questions
concerning immigration status, the Court found the fixed check-
points to pass constitutional muster. Unlike the roving patrol stop
condemned in Brignoni-Ponce, the fixed checkpoint involved
"less discretionary enforcement activity" and provided "less room
for abusive or harassing stops. '97 Furthermore, the occupants
90. Id. at 884. The Court further stated that the fourth amendment was appli-
cable to such brief detentions. In order to be lawful, a seizure must be "reason-
able." Id. at 878. To permit the stop in issue in this case would "dispense entirely
with the requirement [of] reasonable suspicion. . . " Id. at 882.
91. Id. at 885. Other factors suggested by the Court are: characteristics of the
area where the vehicle is encountered; proximity to the border; usual traffic pat-
ters, and previous experience with alien traffic; recent illegal crossings in an area;
erratic driving; a vehicle appearing to be heavily loaded; a large number of passen-
gers; and particular dress and appearance of persons who live in Mexico. Id. at
884-85.
92. 428 U.S. 543 (1976).
93. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 514 F.2d 308 (9th Cir. 1975).
94. United States v. Sifuentes, 517 F.2d 1402 (5th Cir. 1975).
95. Whether all vehicles were actually stopped was not important as the Court
noted that for fourth amendment purposes a seizure had occurred when vehicles
were slowed for inspection. 428 U.S. at 546 n.1.
96. Id. at 546-47, 549-50, 562-63.
97. Id. at 559.
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were initially subjected to only visual inspection and questioning,
not actual searches of their persons or vehicles. 98
Although the Court limited its holding to the type of stop before
it, it suggested further detention would be proper if founded upon
probable cause or consent. 99
V. STOP AND FRISK MATURES
The Court allowed nearly three years to pass before it under-
took further explanation of the law pertaining to police stops.100
In 1979, four separate opinions were written, none of which pro-
vided an overall structural framework by which to judge police
stops.
The first opinion was that of Delaware v. Prouse,'0 which dealt
a fatal blow to the police practice commonly referred to as the
"routine license and registration check." The facts of the case are
uncomplicated. On November 30, 1976, a New Castle County, Del-
aware, patrolman stopped Prouse's vehicle for no reason except
to check his license and registration. Upon approaching the vehi-
cle, the officer smelled marijuana smoke; he seized marijuana that
was allegedly in plain view 0 2 and arrested Prouse. The trial court
suppressed the evidence as being the fruit of an illegal search and
seizure. On appeal, the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed. 0 3
The United States Supreme Court similarly affirmed by an eight
to one majority. Following its lead in United States v. Brignoni-
98. The Court in discussing the fixed checkpoint inspection stated that "here,
... we deal neither with searches nor with the sanctity of private dwellings, ordi-
narily afforded the most stringent Fourth Amendment protection." Id. at 561. See
also United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891 (1975) (striking down searches of occu-
pants and their vehicles without probable cause or consent at fixed checkpoints).
99. 428 U.S. at 567.
100. In 1977, the Court decided Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106 (1977),
where it held that once a person has been lawfully detained for a motor vehicle
violation, the police may order the driver out of the car without violating the
fourth amendment. Id. at 111 n.6. A Terry frisk was then permitted when the ar-
resting officer noticed a bulge that he feared might be a weapon, the Court stating:
"The bulge in the jacket permitted the officer to conclude that Mimms was armed
and thus posed a serious and present danger to the safety of the officer." Id. at
112. The frisk uncovering the weapon was ruled reasonable. Justices Marshall,
Stevens, and Brennan dissented, focusing primarily upon the fact that the arrest-
ing officer had no suspicion of any wrongdoing except that Mimms had an expired
plate, an offense not requiring his being removed from the vehicle. Id. at 112-13
(Marshall, J.; dissenting), 115-24 (Stevens, Brennan, Marshall, J.J.; dissenting).
101. 440 U.S. 648 (1979).
102. Id. at 650.
103. State v. Prouse, 382 A.2d 1359 (Del. Super. Ct. 1978).
Ponce, the Court condemned the seizure of individuals in their
vehicles without "articulable and reasonable suspicion that a mo-
torist is unlicensed or. . .not registered,"'104 unless, as in United
States v. Martinez-Fuerte, the seizure was conducted pursuant to
a procedure assuring true randomness, such as the use of "road-
block-type stops,"105 where everyone is questioned.106
When Prouse is considered in juxtaposition with the opinions of
Brignoni-Ponce and Martinez-Fuerte, a pattern of logical consis-
tency emerges. The stop of a motor vehicle in the absence of any
articulable facts suggesting a violation of the law is forbidden
where the stop is the result of the unfettered discretion of the po-
lice officer in the field.107 Because the government has an interest
in preventing illegal aliens from entering the country and seeing
that drivers of motor vehicles are properly licensed and their ve-
hicles registered, the interest may be effectuated in other, less in-
trusive, ways as long as the manner chosen treats everyone
similarly.O8 However, once minimal articulable facts suggest a
possible violation of the law, a stop may be made by an individual
officer free from the strictures imposed by Brignoni-Ponce and
Prouse 109
The Prouse decision was followed by Dunaway v. New York, 110
a case involving statements made by Dunaway implicating him-
104. 440 U.S. at 663.
105. Id.
106. The State of Delaware's primary emphasis was that the governmental in-
terest in safe highway usage outweighed the individual's right of privacy, a posi-
tion the State erroneously believed was left open in United States v. Brignoni-
Ponce, 422 U.S. at 883 n.8 and United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 560 n.14.
The Court considered the governmental interest, but felt it could be served in a
manner less intrusive and free from total discretion subject to abuse.
107. 440 U.S. at 662-63. The Court stated that:
[E]xcept in those situations in which there is a least articulable and
reasonable suspicion that a motorist is unlicensed or that an automobile is
not registered, or that either the vehicle or an occupant is otherwise sub-
ject to seizure for violation of law, stopping an automobile and detaining
the driver in order to check his driver's license and the registration of the
automobile are unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment .... We
hold only that persons in automobiles on public roadways may not for
that reason llone have their travel and privacy interfered with at the un-
bridled discretion of police officers.
Id. at 663.
108. See, e.g., id. at 663 (where the Court suggests the possible alternative of
questioning all oncoming traffic at roadblock-type stops).
109. See, e.g., United States v. Barnard, 553 F.2d 389 (5th Cir. 1977), where a
stop was upheld, one factor was that the car from another country was seen in an
area where tourist or business traffic was unlikely; United States v. Sperow, 551
F.2d 808 (10th Cir. 1977), upheld a stop using as one factor that it was 2 a.m., when
ranchers in the area were not prone to drive. Another factor was that the driver
repeatedly and nervously looked at the border patrol officer and then drove errati-
cally.
110. 442 U.S. 200 (1979).
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self in the murder of the proprietor of a pizza parlor nearly five
months earlier. The circumstances under which the statements
were made were held to be violative of the fourth amendment.
In Dunaway, a detective with the Rochester Police Department
received information through another officer that an informant
had implicated Dunaway in the crime. After questioning the in-
formant, the detective did not learn anything that would have jus-
tified an arrest warrant.1 1 ' In lieu of seeking Dunaway's
cooperation, such as by asking him to come to the police sta-
tion, 1X2 the detective "ordered other detectives to 'pick-up' [Duna-
way] and 'bring him in.' 113 Dunaway was subsequently taken
from a neighbor's house and escorted to police headquarters,
where he was placed in an interrogation room and questioned af-
ter being given Miranda warnings.1 4 When told to come with the
officers, Dunaway was not informed he was under arrest although
"he would have been physically restrained if he had attempted to
leave."" 5
In finding that the police lacked probable cause to arrest Duna-
way, the Supreme Court held that the statements made by Duna-
way during interrogation were unlawfully obtained. This case
was not a "stop and frisk" situation based upon reasonable suspi-
cion requiring further investigation sanctioned by Terry and its
progeny.1 6 Instead, the police attempted to effectuate an actual
arrest, far removed in time from the incident, while lacking proba-
ble cause.1 17 The opinion was a natural extension of the Court's
prior holdings in Davis v. Mississippi and Brown v. Illinois;118
cases where similar custodial arrests and their fruits were strick-
en for being made without probable cause.
Justice Rehnquist, joined by Chief Justice Burger, dissented,
111. Id. at 203.
112. See, e.g., Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492 (1977).
113. 442 U.S. at 203.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 210-11 (where the Court stated that "[tIhe investigative stops usually
consumed less than a minute and involved 'a brief question or two.' ").
117. Id. at 202-03. The murder took place on March 26, 1971, yet Dunaway was
not taken into custody until August 11, 1971, as a result of a lead given by an in-
formant on August 10, 1971. However, this lead was not "enough information to get
a warrant" for Dunaway's arrest. Id. at 203.
118. See 422 U.S. 590 (1975). Comment, Dunaway v. New York: Fourth Amend-
ment Protections Against Unreasonable Searches and Seizures Closely Guarded, 6
OHio N.U.L. REV. 618, 621 (1979).
stating that "this is a case where the defendant voluntarily ac-
companied the police to the station to answer their questions." 119
Dunaway was never physically seized, never told he was under
arrest, or warned that he would not be permitted to decline the
invitation. Thus, the dissenters concluded on the record before
the Court, that the police behavior appeared free of "physical
force or show of authority," the touchstone phrase used in Terry
to determine when a seizure has occurred. 120 Moreover, the fact
that the police had orders to "pick up" Dunaway and would not
have let him decline the invitation was of no importance in deter-
mining whether Dunaway cooperated voluntarily.'21 The fact that
Chief Justice Burger, as expected, joined in this approach to the
issue of voluntary cooperation, will become more meaningful
when the controversial decision of United States v. Mendenhall122
is discussed.
Only three weeks after the Dunaway decision, Brown v.
Texas,123 a case very similar to Sibron, was handed down. In
Brown, two officers with the El Paso Police Department were
cruising in their patrol car at 12:45 in the afternoon in an area hav-
ing a high incidence of drug traffic. The officers observed Brown
walking away from another man in an alley. Not suspecting
Brown of any "specific misconduct" or having any reason to be-
lieve he was armed, the officers decided to stop him because he
looked suspicious and was not known to either of them.124 When
asked to identify himself, Brown refused and angrily asserted
that the officers had no right to stop him. 25 After he continued to
refuse to identify himself, Brown was arrested for violating a
Texas law requiring a person "lawfully stopped" to give his name
and address. 2 6
On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed Brown's conviction
without any dissent. 27 The Court found that Brown was seized
within the meaning of the fourth amendment when he was de-
tained for the purpose of requiring him to identify himself.128 Ab-
119. 442 U.S. at 222.
120. 392 U.S. at 19 n.16.
121. "ITihe unexpressed intentions of police officers as to hypothetical situa-
tions have little bearing on the questions whether the police conduct, objectively
viewed, restrained petitioner's liberty by show of force or authority." 442 U.S. at
224.
122. 100 S. Ct. 1870 (1980).
123. 443 U.S. 47 (1979).
124. Id. at 49.
125. Id.
126. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 38.02(a) (Vernon 1974).
127. 443 U.S. at 53. Chief Justice Burger delivered the opinion for a unanimous
court.
128. Id. at 50.
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sent any articulable facts justifying the stop, however, the police
action was viewed as an arbitrary invasion of Brown's rights
"solely at the unfettered discretion of [the] officers,"129 a police
procedure soundly put to rest by Prouse. The record was void of
any evidence justifying the stop. The Court concluded by stating
that "[i]n the absence of any basis for suspecting appellant of
misconduct, the balance between the public interest and appel-
lant's right to personal security and privacy tilts in favor of free-
dom from police interference."130
At first blush, the Brown opinion appears entirely consistent
with Prouse. Neither a motor vehicle nor pedestrian may be
seized absent some articulable suspicion justifying the stop.
Apart from this congruence, however, the opinions differ. Prouse
holds a motor vehicle may not be stopped without a certain modi-
cum of suspicion. Brown only condemns the seizure performed
for the purpose of requiring identification, and voided the convic-
tion for violation of Texas's identification law. The opinion does
not state or imply that the officers could not have approached
Brown and asked him if he were new in the area, or even asked
him his name. But absent additional facts, Brown was perfectly
within his rights to refuse to cooperate and the officer had no fur-
ther right to detain him.13' However, had Brown voluntarily coop-
erated and in some manner caused sufficient suspicion to be cast
upon himself, a detention or frisk may well have been proper. As-
suming a police officer has the same rights as any other citizen to
ask questions of anyone, consent to answer or give up certain
rights should not be thwarted, if in hindsight cooperation proves
to be detrimental or the person contends the police presence was
inherently coercive.' 32
129. Id. at 51.
130. Id. at 52.
131. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 19 n.16. See also id. at 32 (Harlan, J.; concurring).
132. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 247 (1973), in which the Court
specifically rejected this latter argument as follows: "Miranda, of course, did not
reach investigative questioning of a person not in custody, which is most directly
analogous to the situation of a consent search, and it assuredly did not indicate
that such questioning ought to be deemed inherently coercive." See also Duna-
way v. New York, 442 U.S. at 222 (Rehnquist, J,; dissenting), in which it was stated:
Voluntary questioning not involving any "seizure" for Fourth Amendment
purposes may take place under any number of varying circumstances.
And the occasions will not be few when a particular individual agrees vol-
untarily to answer questions that the police wish to put to him either on
the street, at the station, or in his house, and later regrets his willingness
to answer those questions. However, such morning-after regrets do not
A fourth case was decided during the 1979 term which touched
upon the bounds of seizures authorized by the Terry line of deci-
sions. In Ybarra v. Illinois,133 the Court by a six to three majority
struck down an Illinois statute authorizing the police to search
anyone on the premises where a lawful warrant search was being
carried out.134 Pursuant to a search warrant for drugs directed at
the Aurora Tap Tavern and the bartender, Ybarra, who happened
to be on the premises when the warrant was executed and who
was doing nothing suspicious, was frisked.135 A cigarette pack
was removed from his person and found to contain six tinfoil
packets of heroin. He was arrested and convicted of possession of
heroin.136 In reversing the conviction, the Court reiterated that
mere propinquity to others possibly engaged in crime does not
justify a search. 37 Nor was there any reason to suspect that
Ybarra might be armed and, therefore, a threat to police safety.
The dissent by Chief Justice Burger, and Associate Justices
Rehnquist and Blackmun, would have affirmed the conviction,
suggesting that the balance between individual privacy and safety
of police officers should be struck in favor of the police, particu-




No case decided during the Terry era had produced as severe
an internal split among the justices as the opinion in United
States v. Mendenhall.139 Recognizing the possible significance of
this decision, the factual setting merits extended treatment.
Sylvia Mendenhall arrived early on the morning of February 10,
1976, at the Detroit Metropolitan Airport aboard a commercial
flight originating in Los Angeles, California. She was observed
disembarking from the plane by two agents of the Drug Enforce-
ment Administration (DEA) who were at the airport for the pur-
pose of detecting narcotics traffic. 140 Believing that Ms.
render involuntary responses that were voluntary at the time they were
made.
133, 444 U.S. 85 (1979).
134. Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963, 1963 Ill. Laws § 108-1 et. seq., ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 38, § 108-9 (West 1975).
135. "Ybarra made no gestures indicative of criminal conduct, made no move-
ments that might suggest an attempt to conceal contraband, and said nothing of
suspicious nature to the police officers." 444 U.S. at 91.
136. Id. at 89.
137. Id. at 91. See also Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. at 62-63.
138. 444 U.S. at 96-97 (Opinion by Burger, C.J.; Blackman, Rehnquist, J.J.; con-
curring).
139. 100 S. Ct. 1870 (1980).
140. 100 S. Ct. at 1873.
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Mendenhall's conduct was "characteristic of persons carrying nar-
cotics," the agents walked up to her in the concourse area, identi-
fied themselves, and asked to see her identification and airline
ticket. The conduct causing the agents to conclude Ms.
Mendenhall fit the "drug courier profile" was as follows:
1. She arrived on a flight from Los Angeles, a city believed to be the origin
of much of the heroin reaching Detroit;
2. She was the last person to leave the plane, appeared "very nervous"
and "completely scanned the whole area", including where the agents
were stationed;
3. After leaving the plane she walked past the baggage claim area without
picking up any luggage; and
4. She changed airlines for her flight out of Detroit.14 1
Ms. Mendenhall complied with the agents' request. The license
was in her name, but the airline ticket bore the name "Annette
Ford," an alias Ms. Mendenhall confessed she "just felt like us-
ing."' 4 2 After answering another question that revealed she had
only been in California for two days, one of the agents further
identified himself as a federal narcotics agent. At that point, Ms.
Mendenhall became visibly shaken and had a hard time speaking.
The agent then returned her ticket and license and asked if she
would come with him to the airport DEA office for further ques-
tions. Ms. Mendenhall, apparently without making a verbal re-
sponse, proceeded to the office which was located approximately
fifty feet from where she was approached.143 Once in the office,
one of the agents requested permission to search her person and
handbag. Despite being advised that she could refuse the re-
quested searches, Ms. Mendenhall responded, "Go ahead."'" The
search of her bag revealed a receipt for another airline ticket from
Pittsburg, through Chicago, to Los Angeles in the name "F.
Bush." In response to another query, she said the receipt was
hers.145
A female officer arrived to conduct the search of Ms. Menden-
hall's person. Before undertaking the search, the female officer
again inquired whether Ms. Mendenhall was consenting to the
search. Again the response was affirmative. As Ms. Mendenhall
removed her clothes, she took from her undergarments two small
packages, one of which appeared to contain heroin, and handed
141. 100 S. Ct. at 1873 n.l.




both to the policewoman. 146 Ms. Mendenhall was then arrested
for possession of heroin.
The trial court refused to suppress the heroin, finding there ex-
isted specific and articulable facts justifying suspicion of criminal
activity, that the defendant voluntarily cooperated with the
agents, and had lawfully consented to the searches.147 The court
of appeals reversed, disapproving of the "drug courier profile,"
finding nothing inherently suspicious in Ms. Mendenhall's con-
duct. The court assumed that there was a permissible stop, but it
also assumed that an arrest lacking the necessary probable cause
occurred when the agents asked her to come to their office.148
The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals in a five to
four decision, in which the majority split three to two in its analy-
sis of the facts. Upon stating the facts in the opinion, Justices
Stewart and Rehnquist proceeded to find there was no seizure
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. The issue of con-
sent,149 broached in several earlier decisions, was this time raised
by the United States.150
Focusing upon that part of the Terry opinion stating that "not
all personal intercourse between policemen and citizens involves
'seizures' of persons,' 5 ' Justices Stewart and Rehnquist drew a
line "between an intrusion amounting to a 'seizure' of the person
and an encounter that protrudes upon no constitutionally pro-
tected interest."'152 Since the agents did not seize 53 Ms. Menden-
hall by means of physical force or a show of authority,154 Justices
146. Id.
147. This was reiterated by the Supreme Court, 100 S. Ct. at 1872.
148. 596 F.2d 706 (6th Cir. 1979).
149. For one to validly consent to a search, the person must understand exactly
what he is consenting to. In light of the fact his consent constitutes a waiver of his
constitutional rights under the fourth amendment, at a subsequent suppression
hearing, the prosecution has the burden of establishing that any purported con-
sent was "understandably, freely, and voluntarily given, and that the consent was
specific and absolutely clear." J. CREAMER, THE LAw OF ARREST, SEARCH AND
SEIZURE 88 (3d ed. 1980). For a more thorough discussion of the nature and scope
of consent, see 3 W. LAFAVE, supra note 80, at 611.
150. Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. at 221-25 (Rehnquist, J.; dissenting).
151. Terry v. Ohio, 392 at 19 n.16.
152. 100 S. Ct. at 1876. See also Terry, 392 U.S. at 31-34 (Harlan, J.; concurring).
153. The unexpressed intention of the agents to detain Ms. Mendenhall was
viewed as "irrelevant" to the inquiry at hand. 100 S. Ct. at 1877 n.6.
154. Justices Stewart and Rehnquist defined a show of authority as follows:
We conclude that a person has been "seized" within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment only if, in view of all of the circumstances surround-
ing the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not
free to leave. Examples of circumstances that might indicate a seizure,
even where the person did not attempt to leave, would be the threatening
presence of several officers, the display of a weapon by an officer, some
physical touching of the person of the citizen, or the use of language or
tone of voice indicating that compliance with the officer's request might be
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Stewart and Rehnquist conclude she had voluntarily cooperated
with them.
On the facts of this case, no "seizure" of the respondent occurred. The
events took place in the public concourse. The agents wore no uniforms
and displayed no weapons. They did not summon the respondent to their
presence, but instead approached her and identified themselves as federal
agents. They requested, but did not demand to see the respondent's iden-
tification and ticket. Such conduct, without more, did not amount to an in-
trusion upon any constitutionally protected interest.
1 5 5
The fact that Ms. Mendenhall was not informed that she could re-
fuse to cooperate from the inception of the stop was seen as im-
material. 156
After holding the stop did not implicate the fourth amendment,
Justices Stewart and Rehnquist, joined by Chief Justice Burger
and Justices Powell and Blackmun, held that, under the totality of
the circumstances, Ms. Mendenhall had voluntarily consented to
the searches of her pocketbook and person in the DEA office. 157
Without disagreeing with Justices Stewart and Rehnquist,158
the remaining members of the Court's majority found the stop
valid for another reason which was explained by Justice Powell:
"I would hold . . . that the federal agents had reasonable suspi-
cion that the respondent was engaging in criminal conduct, and,
compelled. [citations omitted] In the absence of some such evidence,
otherwise inoffensive contact between a member of the public and the po-
lice cannot, as a matter of law, amount to a seizure of that person.
100 S. Ct. at 1877. Can it be argued that a reasonable person would not believe he
or she was detained when approached by two federal agents, who show their iden-
tity and request specific information? Consider the following:
The motives that lead one to cooperate with the police are various. To
put an extreme case, the police may in purely precatory language request
a person to give information. Even if he is guilty, such a person might ac-
cede to the request because he has been trained to submit to the wishes
of persons in authority, or because he fears that a refusal will focus suspi-
cion, or because he believes that concealment is no longer possible and a
cooperative posture tactically or psychologically preferable. Regardless of
the particular motive, the cooperation is clearly a response to the author-
ity of the police.
PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE, supra note 17, at 259-60.
155. 100 S. Ct. at 1877.
156. Id. at 1878. Cf. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. at 227 (failure of police
to advise accused of rights before inquiry is a factor, but not in and of itself deter-
minative).
157. 100 S. Ct. at 1879.
158. "I do not necessarily disagree with the views expressed in Part II-A. For
me, the question whether respondent in this case reasonably could have thought
she was free to "walk away" when asked by two government agents for her
driver's license and ticket is extremely close." Id. at 1880 n.1 (Powell, J.; concur-
ring in part, joined by Burger, C.J. and Blackman, J.).
therefore, that they [the agents] did not violate the Fourth
Amendment by stopping the respondent for routine question-
ing."1 59
The public's "interest in detecting those who would traffic in
deadly drugs for personal profit"160 was seen as compelling. In an
attempt to combat the menace, the DEA developed a nationwide
"drug courier profile" which statistics showed to be successful.161
The reasonable and articulable suspicion of criminal activity was
that of specially trained officers acting pursuant to the federal
program.162
A bitter dissent was authored by Justice White, and joined by
Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens. The dissent emphati-
cally rejects the notion that consent can be presumed from a
showing of acquiescence to authority and suggests that all stops
are seizures. 163 Additionally, it was argued that, "Inione of the'
aspects of Ms. Mendenhall's conduct, either alone or in combina-
tion, were sufficient to provide reasonable suspicion that she was
engaged in criminal activity."16 4
The impact of the Mendenhall decision is obvious. As the Court
suggested in United States v. Brignoni-Ponce,165 the standard for
determining what suffices as reasonable and articulable suspicion
may be substantially less than first supposed. It is an inalterable
fact that none of Ms. Mendenhall's actions singularly suggest
criminal behavior, and the dissenters cogently argued that, even
taking the facts all together, her behavior was innocent in nature.
Nevertheless, it is quite evident that a majority of the Court ap-
pears to be moving in a direction that sanction police actions
based upon a reasonable, common sense standard of suspicion.
Before the legal community had sufficient time to digest the
meaning of Mendenhall and speculate on its future implications,
the Court decided Reid v. Georgia,166 which also involved a stop
made on the basis of the drug courier profile. In a very brief opin-
ion, the Court by an eight to one majority ruled the stop of Reid
was not based on reasonable articulable suspicion. 67 Reid ar-
159. Id. at 1880.
160. Id. at 1881.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 1882. On this issue, the Justices placed a heavy emphasis on the
ability of trained police personnel to "perceive and articulate meaning in given
conduct which would be wholly innocent to the untrained observer." Brown v.
Texas, 443 U.S. at 52 n.2.
163. 100 S. Ct. at 1883. See also Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 548-49
(1968).
164. Id. at 1886.
165. 422 U.S. 873 (1975). See notes 94-97 supra.
166. 100 S. Ct. 2752 (1980).
167. Id. at 2754.
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rived at the Atlanta Airport on a commercial flight from Fort Lau-
derdale, Florida, in the early morning hours of August 14, 1978.168
As he left the plane, Reid was observed by a DEA agent. He was
carrying a shoulder bag like one carried by another man several
persons behind, who also exited the same plane. As he walked
through the concourse area and past the baggage area, Reid "oc-
casionally looked backward in the direction of the second
man."' 69 The two met in the main lobby and left the terminal to-
gether.
Outside the building, the agent approached, identified himself,
and asked to see each of their airline ticket stubs and identifica-
tion. Each man complied.170 The agent then asked if they would
accompany him to the terminal and consent to a search of their
bags and persons. According to the agent, the petitioner nodded
affirmatively and the other man verbally responded: "Yeah,
okay." As they neared the terminal, Reid began to run and aban-
doned his bag. He was apprehended and the bag, which was re-
covered, was found to contain cocaine. 17 1
The trial court suppressed the evidence, holding the DEA agent
lacked articulable suspicion that Reid was carrying narcotics.172
The Georgia Court of Appeals reversed, finding the stop permissi-
ble since Reid fit the profile of drug couriers in a number of re-
spects and that Reid consented to return to the terminal. 73 Once
he fled, the court of appeals found there existed probable cause to
search the discarded shoulder bag.174
Incredibly, the United States Supreme Court175 ignored United
States v. Mendenhall, which was decided barely a month earlier.
Arguably abandoning Mendenhall176 and echoing the sentiments
168. Id. at 2752.






175. Justices Brennan, Stewart, White, Marshall, and Stevens comprised the
five member majority. Justice Powell, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice
Blackmun concurred, agreeing that there was not sufficient facts to justify a
seizure. Id. at 2754 n.1.
176. The suspicious criteria relied upon to justify the stop were: (1) that Reid
arrived on a flight from Fort Lauderdale, a city serving as a principal place of ori-
gin of cocaine sold throughout the country; (2) Reid arrived early in the morning
during a time when law enforcement activity is minimal; (3) Reid and his compan-
ion appeared to be trying to conceal the fact that they were traveling together; and
of the three dissenting judges therein, the Court stated:
We conclude that the agent could not, as a matter of law, have reason-
ably suspected the petitioner of criminal activity on the basis of these cir-
cumstances. Of the evidence relied on, only the fact that the petitioner
preceded another person and occasionally looked backward at him as they
proceeded through the concourse relates to their particular conduct. The
other circumstances describe a very large category of presumably inno-
cent travellers, who would be subject to virtually random seizures were
the Court to conclude that as little foundation as there was in this case
could justify a seizure. Nor can we agree, on this record, that the manner
in which petitioner and his companion walked through the airport reason-
ably could have led the agent to suspect them of wrongdoing. 1 7 7
In lieu of an outright reversal, the case was remanded for fur-
ther proceedings not inconsistent with the holding, leaving open
the possibility that a further development of the facts might show
that Reid voluntarily cooperated until he decided to flee.178 The
initial seizure question was not addressed by the lower courts,
which "apparently assumed that the stop for routine identification
questioning constituted a seizure."17 9
VII. FUTURE IMPLICATIONS
Despite the activity in the past two years, the proper standard
for determining when a fourth amendment "seizure" has occurred
remains unanswered1 80
Recognizing that it may be difficult to develop a standard appli-
cable to all cases,'81 it is incumbent upon the Court to resolve the
most basic issue, namely, when contact between a citizen and po-
lice officer constitutes a seizure pursuant to the fourth amend-
(4) Reid and his friend apparently had no other luggage. Id. at 2753-54. A compar-
ison of these circumstances to those in Mendenhall shows them to be virtually
identical in nature. Why Justice Stewart joined the four dissenters in Mendenhall
remains unexplained.
177. Id. at 2754. The relatively innocent behavior of Reid stands in sharp con-
trast to Howard's behavior in People v. Howard, 50 N.Y.2d 583, 408 N.E.2d 908, 430
N.Y.S.2d 578 (1980). It is submitted that Howard's behavior was far more suspi-
cious and is only similar in the fact that both he and Reid fled and abandoned
property.
178. This conclusion stems from the factual findings of the appellate court. See
note 174 supra and accompanying text.
179. 100 S. Ct. at 2755 (Powell, J.; concurring).
180. See United States v. Hill, 626 F.2d 429 (5th Cir. 1980). The Fifth Circuit re-
versed the district court's finding and held that a DEA agent violated defendant's
fourth amendment rights when defendant had twice refused to consent to a search
without a search warrant, and was never informed he was free to go, and where
the situation indicated that the defendant's detainment was for the purpose of ad-
ditional interrogation. United States v. Robinson, 625 F.2d 1211 (5th Cir. 1980). The
court of appeals remanded the case to the district court in an effort to make
further findings of fact and conclusions of law on the question of whether a person
stopped by a DEA agent in an airport, was free to leave.
181. See LaFave, note 57 supra, at 65-69.
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ment.182 To date, the opinions have not discussed this.183 Police
officers throughout the United States have continuing contact
with citizens in a wide variety of circumstances, many of which
are specifically associated with crime prevention.184 Officers de-
serve to know beforehand what is lawfully permitted. In this re-
gard, it is of little assistance to decide narrow issues, which may
stir spirited debate among legal scholars, when the crime rate has
soared since Terry was decided and shows no signs of abate-
ment. 185
On January 21, 1981, the Supreme Court, without any dissent,
reversed the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals decision in United
182. In this regard it is interesting to note the following comments from the
California Court of Appeal in People v. Guzman, 108 Cal. App. 3d 601, 610, 166 Cal.
Rptr. 633, 638 (1980) (citations omitted), a case holding that the hailing of someone
to a police car cannot be viewed as a seizure.
The question in each case remains, of course, as to "where to draw the
line" in the world of hard discrete fact. To equate mere looking at or
speaking to a possible candidate for "seizure", or the driving of a police
car to the curb adjacent to where a lone man is walking, or the honking of
a horn to attract a person's attention, or the motioning to a stranger re-
questing him to come to the curb, without more, with an "arbitrary and
oppressive interference with the privacy and personal security of the indi-
vidual," is mere sophistry. The Fourth Amendment prohibits "unreason-
able seizures" not eye contacts and greetings. To characterize such
minimal, fleeting, gossamerlike contacts as involved in a simple accosting
or hailing of a prson on the street as a detention or "seizure" would im-
pose unrealistic, unreasonable if not impossible restrictions on law en-
forcement officers.
See also United States v. Elmore, 595 F.2d 1036 (5th Cir. 1979) (refusing to find the
police officers' show of their identification and a request for identification from the
person stopped to be a "seizure").
183. See LaFave, supra note 57, at 46, 64. Another issue not resolved involves
the Miranda warnings. It is submitted, however, that this issue can be settled by
holding the warnings are not applicable in the stop situation unless it escalates
into true custodial interrogation. Miranda itself stated it was not meant to "ham-
per the traditional functions of police officers in investigating crime." 384 U.S. 436,
477 (1966). See also Laury v. State, 260 A.2d 907 (Del. Super. Ct. 1969) (accosting a
robbery suspect near the scene); People v. Schwartz, 30 A.D.2d 385, 292 N.Y.S.2d
518 (1968) (two questions of persons leaving the scene of a reported assault);
United States v. Brown, 436 F.2d 702 (9th Cir. 1970); People v. Manis, 268 Cal. App.
2d 653, 74 Cal. Rptr. 423 (1969); State v. Patterson, 59 Hawaii 357, 581 P.2d 752
(1978); NATIONAL DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S ASSOCIATION, CONFESSIONS AND INTERROGA-
TIONS AFrER MIRANDA 18 (5th ed. 1975); LaFave, supra note 57, at 97-105.
184. See TIFFANY, supra note 82, at 18-43; 3 W. LAFAVE, supra note 80, at 36-37,
69-107.
185. According to the U.S. DEvr. OF JUSTICE, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES (1968 and 1979), the follow-
ing increase of crime is documented.
States v. Cortez.' 86 As anticipated, the decision does little to ad-
vance clarification as to when a police officer may approach a citi-
zen, yet not seize him, in order to investigate crime. 187 Although
the opinion leaves some questions unanswered, it nevertheless
continues the trend toward upholding good faith police actions
based upon circumstances relevant in the police milieu.
188
The Court initially concluded that the Cortez vehicle was seized
within the meaning of the fourth amendment. 189 At this point,
however, the Court significantly departs from the language of its
1968 Rate-one per every; 1979 Rate-one per every.
Murders 10,920 48 min. 20,591 24 min.
Rapes 25,330 21 rin 75,989 7 rin.
Robbery 153,420 2 1/2 rain. 466,881 68 sec.
Assault 231,800 2 min. 614,213 51 sec.
Burglary 1,370,300 23 sec. 3,299,484 10 sec.
During the first six months of 1980, serious crime increased another 10%. See
Fear Stalks the Streets, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Oct. 27, 1980, at 58-60. Even
more appalling are the results of the "Figgie Report" cited in the above article
which indicates that "fear of crime is so pervasive that it is reshaping the way peo-
ple lead their lives." Id.
Perhaps the best summary of what really occurs, appears in a statement made
by New York City Police Commissioner Robert McGuire, who was a prosecutor
and defense attorney during his career.
This system is in crisis, yet there's no crisis atmosphere. You don't see peo-
ple in the system working through the night or anything like that. Instead,
we're all trivializing crime because there's just so much of it .... A resi-
dential burglary is treated like an insurance claim. A robbery is just an-
other robbery .... We've literally changed the normative standards by
which we live, and those of us in the system have hidden behind lack of
resources to say that we can't do anything about.
Brill, Crime and No Punishment, THE AMERICAN LAWYER, Jan. 1981, at 23 (empha-
sis in original).
186. 49 U.S.L.W. 4099 (1981).
187. The Court reiterates the standard that the police must comply with in or-
der to permissibly stop a vehicle. First, the assessment must be based on all the
circumstances. This standard refers to the objective observations of the officer
surrounding the incident. The Court held that by looking at the whole picture, it
could be justified "by some objective manifestation that the person stopped is, or
is about to be, engaged in criminal activity." 49 U.S.L.W. at 4101. This standard
had recently been articulated by the Court in Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. at 51 (1979).
The second element contained in the assessment of the whole picture is that the
circumstances, investigation, and inferences lead the officer to suspect the particu-
lar individual is engaged in wrongdoing. This principle was established in Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. at 16-19 by Chief Justice Warren. Consequently, the holding of the
Court in this case, does little to clarify the right of a policeman to approach a citi-
zen; however, it does provide another set of circumstances in which the Court has
allowed an officer to stop a citizen and conduct a brief investigation.
188. The Court took notice of the fact that patrolling a 2,000 mile open border
was difficult and that certain skills are required when attempting to halt illegal en-
try. Furthermore, the Court stated that, "[wie see here the kind of police work
often suggested by judges and scholars as examples of appropriate and reasonable
means of law enforcement." 49 U.S.L.W. at 4102.
189. Id. at 4101.
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previous opinions which used terms like "articulable reasons"
and "founded-suspicion." 90 These terms are seen as falling
"short of providing clear guidance dispositive of the myriad fac-
tual situations that arise."191 Instead, the Court, still holding that
suspicion is the sine qua non to justify a seizure, expressly stated
that the field of reference is to encompass "the totality of the cir-
cumstances-the whole picture" 9 2 which faces an officer at the
moment of decision making.
Applying the above test, the Court had little difficulty conclud-
ing that the collection of facts, some meaningless to the "un-
trained," gathered by the border patrol officers justified the
seizure of the vehicle to question the occupants about immigra-
tion status and citizenship.193 Despite permitting the stop, the
Court did not decide whether the search of the vehicle was a right
concomitant with the seizure. This critical issue was avoided by
concluding that the search resulted from voluntary cooperation
by Cortez, who opened the back of the camper.194
VIII. THE MODEL RULES OF STOP AND FRISK
There is nothing inherently wrong with allowing police officers
at least that right possessed by every citizen to make innocuous
contacts with pedestrians and the further right to request infor-




193. Id. at 4102.
194. Id. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973). The Court held
that when a search is justified on consent and the suspect is not in custody, the
protection of the fifth and fourteenth amendments require that the state demon-
strate the consent was voluntary. This problem was avoided by the Court. Chief
Justice Burger concluded, "only the stop, not the search is at issue here." Id.
However, the Court did note that the right to search the camper was not based on
probable cause, but instead, on the whole picture. As experienced border patrol
officers, they could reasonably believe that a criminal activity was taking place in
the vehicle they stopped. Id.
195. Perhaps the leading case espousing this position is People v. De Bour, 40
N.Y.2d 210, 352 N.E.2d 562, 386 N.Y.S.2d 375 (1976), holding a police officer, in the
absence of any specific indication of criminal conduct, may approach a private citi-
zen on the street and request information. At the time of the stop, De Bour was
walking along at approximately 12:15 a.m. When he got to within 30 to 40 feet of
two New York police officers he crossed the street. The officers followed and upon
reaching De Bour, asked what he was doing in the area. Shortly thereafter, one of
the officers noticed a bulge in De Bour's jacket and asked him to unzip it. A re-
volver was found in his waistband and De Bour was arrested. Id. at 214-15. While
reasonable person to believe criminal activity may be afoot, citi-
zens possess the right under the constitution not to be detained.
Should an officer, however, have a reasonable belief of possible
criminal conduct based upon articulable facts, or develop such be-
lief as the result of voluntary action or lack of cooperation, such
as immediate flight, a further detention for investigative purposes
must be permitted.196 In those situations justifying an investiga-
tive detention, a frisk should be permitted where the police officer
reasonably believes the suspect is armed or the possible crime is
one which the suspect might likely be armed.197 Such a test
would preserve individual privacy in those minor cases of sus-
pected criminality such as gambling, prostitution, and minor pos-
sessory drug offense. 198 Additionally, where an investigative
this writer believes De Bour was correctly decided, the case has been subject to
criticism. See Note, People v. De Bour: The Power of Police to Stop and Frisk Citi-
zens, 30 SYRACUSE L. REv. 893 (1979); Comment, Criminal Procedure-Search and
Seizure-Admissibility of Evidence Seized During Police-Citizen "Encounter" De-
termined Solely by Reasonableness of Police Conduct, 8 RUT.-CAM. L.J. 359 (1977).
Other writers condemn any stops based upon less than probable cause. See Am-
sterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 395 (1974);
Schwartz, Stop and Frisk, 58 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 433 (1967).
196. It should be noted that the situation in which the detention occurs has
often influenced the Court in determining the amount of suspicion the officer must
have. For instance, in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), the Court stated a limited
search could be conducted if the officer had reasonable fear for his own or others'
safety. Whereas, an officer conducting a driver's license check must have articul-
able and reasonable suspicion that the motorist is unlicensed. See Delaware v.
Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979). In another instance, the automobile has traditionally
been viewed as having a lesser degree of privacy than a person's home, effects and
self. See Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970); Carroll v. United States, 267
U.S. 132 (1925). In Prouse, however, the Court lays the groundwork for the propo-
sition that a police officer may have a greater right to stop a person on the street
than in a vehicle by stating: "Many people spend more hours each day traveling in
cars than walking on the streets. Undoubtedly, many find a greater sense of secur-
ity and privacy in traveling in an automobile than they do in exposing themselves
by pedestrian or other modes of travel." 440 U.S. at 662.
197. See Terry, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), where the Court held that where an officer ob-
serves unusual conduct which leads him to believe, in light of his experience, that
criminal conduct may be afoot and that he may be dealing with armed and danger-
ous individuals, the officer has the right to conduct a limited search of the outer
clothing of the suspect in an attempt to discover weapons. For an additional dis-
cussion by the Supreme Court on this principle, see, e.g., Sibron v. New York and
Peters v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968). See also Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143
(1972), where the Court, based upon its holding in Terry, stated an officer had the
right to reach in a car and remove a gun from the. suspect's waistband, based upon
a tip by an informant known to the officer.
198. The detention would be permitted where the officer reasonably, under the
circumstances, felt a crime had been or was going to be committed. However,
those accused of so-called victimless crimes would not be suspect to a frisk unless,
in the light of his experiences, he could reasonably believe that the person with
whom he is dealing may be armed. Additionally, he must reasonably fear for his
own or others' safety. This is assuming that generally those accused of a vic-
timless crime will not exhibit traits which would justify an officer invading the in-
dividual's right to privacy.
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detention is called for, the officer should be permitted to tempora-
rily freeze the situation for a short period of time to make the
necessary investigation of the suspect, including the right to ob-
tain the person's name, address, and explanation of behavior
without the requirement of Miranda warnings. 199
The format suggested above is essentially that of the Model
Rules of Stop and Frisk prepared by the Project on Law Enforce-
ment Policy and Rulemaking, College of Law, Arizona State Uni-
versity in 1974.200 Adoption of the standards set out in the Model
Rules and urged in this article will have the salutary effect of
bringing order to an area of the law presently plagued by ambigu-
ous decisions and absurd results, offering no guidance to the very
people who must make split-second decisions which sometimes
determine whether a criminal is captured or avoids arrest. In ef-
fecting such a standard, due regard must be given to the rights of
law-abiding citizens to feel secure in their homes.
Application of the above test and a closer scrutiny of the
Supreme Court's opinions since Terry would surely have avoided
the unfortunate result reached by the New York Court of Appeals
in the Howard case, a result that cannot possibly increase respect
for the fourth amendment or protect society's interest in prevent-
ing and solving crime.
APPENDIX
STOP AND FRISK MODEL RULES
By the Project on Law Enforcement Policy and Rulemaking,
College of Law Arizona State University
Rule 101 Preference for Contacts.
Unless an officer concludes that an arrest should be made, or
199. See Terry, 392 U.S. 1 (1960) and Appendix, Rule 22, B-D. For application of
this principle to border searches, see Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S.
266 (1973), where the Court permitted brief detention of individuals crossing the
border in order to allow the individual to identify himself and prove his citizen-
ship.
200. See Appendix.
that a stop is justifiable and appropriate under Rule 201, commu-
nications with a private person should begin with a contact.
Rule 102 Initiating a Contact.
An officer may initiate a contact with a person in any place that
an officer has a right to be. The officer shall identify himself as a
law enforcement officer as soon as reasonably possible after the
contact is made.
Rule 103 Conduct of Contacts.
Persons contacted may not be halted or detained against their
will, or frisked. They may not be required to answer questions or
to cooperate in any way if they do not wish to do so. An officer
may not use force or coercion in initiating a contact or in attempt-
ing to obtain cooperation once the contact is made. If persons
contacted refuse to cooperate, they must be permitted to go on
their way; however, if it seems appropriate under the circum-
stances, they may be kept under surveillance. Since a contact is
not a stop or an arrest, and those persons contacted may be inno-
cent of wrongdoing of any kind, officers should take special care
to act in as restrained and courteous a manner as possible.
Rule 201 Basis for a Stop.
If an officer reasonably suspects that a person has committed, is
committing, or is about to commit any crime, he has the authority
to stop that person. He may exercise this authority in any place
that he has a right to be. Both pedestrians and persons in vehi-
cles may be stopped.
Rule 202 Reasonable Suspicion.
The term reasonable suspicion is not capable of precise defini-
tion; it is more than a hunch or mere speculation on the part of an
officer, but less than the probable cause necessary for arrest. It
may arise out of a contact, or it may exist prior to or indepen-
dently of a contact. Reasonable suspicion has been defined as a
combination of specific and articulable facts, together with rea-
sonable inferences from those facts which, in light of the officer's
experience, reasonably justify a belief that the person to be
stopped has committed, is committing, or is about to commit a
crime.
The following list contains some factors which-alone or in
combination-may be sufficient to establish reasonable suspicion
for a stop:
A. The Person's Appearance. Does he generally fit the
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description of a person wanted for a known offense?
Does he appear to be suffering from a recent injury,
or to be under the influence of alcohol, drugs, or other
intoxicants?
B. The Person's Actions. Is he running away from an ac-
tual or possible crime scene? Is he otherwise behav-
ing in a manner indicating possible criminal conduct?
If so, in what way? Were incriminating statements or
conversations overheard? Is he with companions who
themselves are reasonably suspicious?
C. Prior Knowledge of the Person. Does he have an ar-
rest or conviction record, or is he otherwise known to
have committed a serious offense? If so, is it for of-
fenses similar to one that has just occurred, or which
the officer suspects is about to occur? Does the of-
ficer know of the person's record?
D. Demeanor During a Contact. If he responded to
questions during the contact, were his answers eva-
sive, suspicious or incriminating? Was he excessively
nervous during the contact?
E. Area of the Stop. Is the person near the area of a
known offense soon after its commission? Is the area
known for criminal activity (a high crime area)? If
so, is it the kind of activity the person is thought to
have committed, be committing, or about to commit?
F. Time of Day. Is it a very late hour? Is it usual for
people to be in the area at this time? Is it the time of
day during which criminal activity of the kind sus-
pected usually occurs?
G. Police Training and Experience. Does the person's
conduct resemble the pattern or modus operandi fol-
lowed in particular criminal offenses? Does the in-
vestigating officer have experience in dealing with
the particular kind of criminal activity being investi-
gated?
H. Police Purpose. Was the officer investigating a spe-
cific crime or specific type of criminal activity? How
serious is the suspected criminal activity? Might in-
nocent people be endangered if investigative action is
not taken at once?
I. Source of information. If the basis of the officer's rea-
sonable suspicion is, in whole or in part, information
supplied by another person, what kind of person is the
information source? Is he a criminal informant, a wit-
ness, or a victim of a crime? How reliable does the
person appear to be? Has he supplied information in
the past that proved to be reliable? Is he known to the
officer? Did the officer obtain the information directly
from the person? How did the person obtain his infor-
mation? Was any part of the information corroborated
prior to making the stop?
Rule 203 Citing Justification for a Stop.
Every officer who conducts a stop must be prepared to cite
those specific factors which led him to believe that the stop was
justified.
Rule 204 Stopping Vehicles at Roadblocks.
If authorized to do so by (insert title of ranking police official),
a law enforcement officer may order the drivers of vehicles mov-
ing in a particular direction to stop. Authority to make such stops
shall only be given in those situations where such action is neces-
sary to apprehend the perpetrator of a crime who, if left at large,
can be expected to cause physical harm to other persons, or to
discover the victim of a crime whose physical safety is presently
or potentially in danger. Once a vehicle is stopped pursuant to
this Rule, it may be searched only to the extent necessary to de-
termine if the perpetrator or victim is present in the vehicle, and
such search shall be made as soon as possible after the stop.
Rule 301 Duration of a Stop.
A person stopped pursuant to these Rules may be detained at
or near the scene of the stop for a reasonable period not to exceed
20 minutes. Officers should detain a person only for the length of
time necessary to obtain or verify the person's identification, or
an account of the person's presence or conduct, or an account of
the offense, or otherwise determine if the person should be ar-
rested or released.
Rule 302 Explanation to Detained Person.
Officers shall act with as much restraint and courtesy towards
the person stopped as is possible under the circumstances. The
officer making the stop shall identify himself as a law enforce-
ment officer as soon as practicable after making the stop. At some
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point during the stop the officer shall, in every case, give the per-
son stopped an explanation of the purpose of the stop. [The of-
ficer shall briefly note in the record of the stop the fact that he
gave the person an explanation for the stop and the nature of that
explanation.]
Rule 303 Rights of Detained Person.
The officer may question the detained person for the purpose of
obtaining his name, address, and an explanation of his presence
and conduct. The detained person may not be compelled to an-
swer these questions.
The officer may request the person to produce identification
and may demand the production of certain documents (such as
operator's license and vehicle registration) if the person has been
operating a vehicle and state law authorized such demand. Dur-
ing the questioning, the detained person need not be advised of
his Miranda rights until probable cause to arrest develops, or un-
til the questioning becomes sustained and coercive rather than
brief and casual. When either of these events occurs, the officer
should immediately halt the questioning and advise the detained
person of his Miranda rights.
Rule 304 Effect of Refusal To Cooperate.
Refusal to answer questions or to produce identification does
not by itself establish probable cause to arrest, but such refusal
may be considered along with other facts as an element adding to
probable cause if, under the circumstances, an innocent person
could reasonably be expected not to refuse.
[Refusal to answer questions or to produce identification may
not be considered as an element of probable cause to arrest.
However, such refusal is cause for a further investigation of the
circumstances surrounding the stop. In such cases, the 20-minute
time limitation imposed by Rule 301 does not apply, and the per-
son may be detained for a reasonable time.]
Rule 305 Effecting a Stop and Detention.
A. General Rule. An officer shall use the least coercive
means necessary under the circumstances to effect
the stop. The least coercive means may be a verbal
request, an order, or the use of physical force.
B. Use of Physical Force. An officer may use only such
force as is reasonably necessary to carry out the au-
thority granted by these Rules. The amount of force
used to effect a stop shall not, however, be such that
it could cause death or serious bodily harm to the
person stopped. An officer must not use a weapon or
baton to effect a stop. he may use his hands, legs,
arms, feet, or handcuffs. If the officer is attacked, or
circumstances exist that create probable cause to ar-
rest, the officer may use the amount of force neces-
sary to defend himself or to effect a full-custody
arrest.
Rule 401 Identification of Witnesses.
An officer who has probable cause to believe that any felony, or
a misdemeanor involving danger to persons or property, has just
been committed, and who has probable cause to believe that a
person found near the scene of such offense has knowledge of sig-
nificant value to the investigation of the offense, may order that
person to stop. The sole purpose of this stop is to obtain a reluc-
tant witness' identification so that he may later be contacted by
the officer's agency or a prosecuting agency. Officers shall not use
force to obtain this identification. (This Rule does not regulate or
limit interviews with willing and cooperative witnesses.)
Rule 501 When To Frisk.
A law enforcement officer may frisk any person whom he has
stopped when the officer reasonably suspects that the person is
carrying a concealed weapon or dangerous instrument and that a
frisk is necessary to protect the officer or others. The frisk may
be conducted immediately upon making the stop or at any time
during the stop-whenever a reasonable suspicion to frisk arises.
Rule 502 Reasonable Suspicion for a Frisk.
Reasonable suspicion for a valid frisk is more than a vague
hunch and less than probable cause. (See Rule 202.) If a reason-
ably prudent officer, under the circumstances, would believe his
safety or that of other persons in the vicinity is in danger because
a particular person might be carrying a weapon or dangerous in-
strument, a frisk is justified.
The following list contains some factors which-alone or in
combination-may be sufficient to create reasonable suspicion for
a frisk:
A. The Person's Appearance. Do his clothes bulge in a
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manner suggesting the presence of any object capa-
ble of inflicting injury?
B. The Persons's Actions. Did he make a furtive move-
ment, as if to hide a weapon, as he was approached?
Is he nervous during the course of the detention?
Are his words or actions threatening?
C. Prior Knowledge. Does the officer know if the person
has a police record for weapons offenses? For as-
saults (on police officers or others)? Does the officer
know if the person has a reputation for carrying
weapons or for violent behavior?
D. Location. Is the area known for criminal activity-a
"high crime" area? Is the area sufficiently isolated so
that the officer is unlikely to receive aid if attacked?
E. Time of Day. Is the confrontation taking place at
night? Does this contribute to the likelihood that the
officer will be attacked?
F. Police Purpose. Does the officer's suspicion of the
suspect involve a serious and violent offense? An
armed offense? (If so, the same factors justifying the
stop also justify the frisk.)
G. Companions. Has the officer detained a number of
people at the same time? Has a frisk of a companion
of the suspect revealed a weapon? Does the officer
have assistance immediately available to handle the
number of persons he has stopped?
Rule 503 Citing Justification for a Frisk.
Every officer who conducts a frisk must be prepared to cite
those specific factors which led him to conclude that reasonable
suspicion existed before the frisk began.
Rule 601 General Conduct of a Frisk.
A. Securing Separable Possessions. If the person is car-
rying an object immediately separable from his per-
son, e.g., a purse, shopping bag or briefcase, it should
be taken from him. The officer should not immedi-
ately look inside the object, but should place it in a
secure location out of the person's reach for the dura-
tion of the detention.
B. Beginning.the Frisk: Pat-down. The officer should
begin the frisk at that part of the person's apparel
most likely to contain a weapon or dangerous instru-
ment. Frisks are limited to a pat-down of the per-
son's outer clothing unless:
(i) The outer clothing is too bulky to allow the officer
to determine if a weapon or dangerous instrument is
concealed underneath. In this event, outer clothing
such as overcoats and jackets may be opened to allow
a pat-down directly on the inner clothing, such as
shirts and trousers; or
(ii) The officer has a reasonable belief, based on reli-
able information or his own knowledge and observa-
tions, that a weapon or dangerous instrument is
concealed at a particular location on the person, such
as a pocket, waistband, or sleeve. In this event, the
officer may reach directly into the suspected area.
This is an unusual procedure, and any officer to pro-
ceeding must be prepared to cite the precise factors
which led him to forego the normal pat-down proce-
dure.
C. Securing Areas Within Reach. The officer may also
frisk or secure any areas within the detained per-
son's immediate reach, if the officer reasonably sus-
pects that such areas might contain a weapon or
dangerous instrument.
Rule 602 Procedures When a Frisk Discloses an Object That
Might Be or Contain a Weapon or Dangerous Instrument.
If, when conducting a frisk, the officer feels an object which he
reasonably believes is a weapon or dangerous instrument or may
contain such an item, he may reach into the area of the person's
clothing where the object is located, e.g., a pocket, waistband, or
sleeve, and remove the object. The object removed will be one of
the following:
(i) A weapon or dangerous instrument;
(ii) A seizable item;
(iii) An object that is none of the above.
(iv) an object capable of containing a weapon or danger-
ous instrument.
Depending on which category the removed object falls into, the
officer should proceed in one of the following ways:
A. (Category 1) The Object Is a Weapon or Dangerous
Instrument. The officer should determine if the per-
son's possession of the weapon or dangerous instru-
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ment is licensed or otherwise lawful. If lawful, the
officer should place the object in a secure location out
of the person's reach for the duration of the deten-
tion. Ammunition may be removed from any firearm,
and the weapon [and ammunition] returned in a
manner that insures the officer's safety. [The officer
should tell the person that he may claim the ammuni-
tion within - hours at (insert location of property
custodian).
If the possession is unlawful, the officer may seize the weapon
or dangerous instrument, and he may arrest the person and con-
duct a full-custody search of him.
B. (Category 2) The Object Is a Seizable Item. If the
object is a seizable item, the officer may seize and
consider it in determining if probable cause exists to
arrest the person. If the officer arrests the person he
may conduct a full-custody search of him.
C. (Category 3) The Object Is a Container Capable of
Holding a Weapon or Dangerous Instrument. If the
object is a container that could reasonably contain a
weapon or dangerous instrument and if the officer
has a reasonable belief that it does contain such an
item, he may look inside the object and briefly ex-
amine its contents. If the object does contain a
weapon or dangerous instrument, or seizable item,
the officer should proceed as in (A) or (B) above.
However, if the officer upon examining the contents
of the object finds no weapon or dangerous instru-
ment, or seizable item, he should return it to the per-
son and continue with the frisk or detention.
If the object is a container that could not reasonably
contain a weapon or dangerous instrument, or if the
officer does not have a reasonable belief that it con-
tains such an item, then he should not look inside it.
He may either return the object to the person and
continue with the frisk or detention, or he may treat
the object as a separable item, as provided in Rule
601(A).
D. (Category 4) The Object Is Not a Weapon or Danger-
ous Instrument, Not a Seizable Item, and Not Capa-
ble of Holding a Weapon or Dangerous Instrument. If
the object does not fall into any of the Categories 1, 2,
or 3 above, the officer should not look inside the ob-
ject but should return it to the person and continue
with the frisk or detention.
E. Inadvertent Discovery of Another Object. If removal
of the suspected object simultaneously discloses a
second object that itself is a seizable item, the officer
may lawfully seize the second object. The second ob-
ject should be considered in determining whether
probable cause exists to arrest the person. If proba-
ble cause does exist, the officer should tell the person
he is under arrest, and conduct a full-custody search
incidental to the arrest.
Rule 603 Procedure When a Frisk Discloses an Object That Might
Be a Seizable Item.
If, while conducting a frisk, an officer feels an object which he
does not reasonably believe to be a weapon or dangerous instru-
ment, but does believe to be a seizable item, he may not--on the
basis of his authority to frisk-take further steps to examine the
object. However, if the nature of the object felt-alone or in com-
bination with other factors-creates probable cause to believe
that a crime is being committed in his presence, the officer should
tell the person he is under arrest for that crime. He may then
conduct a full-custody search incidental to arrest, but must not
take any step to examine the object before making the arrest. If a
seizable item is not found, the person should be released pursu-
ant to (insert appropriate agency procedure).
Rule 604 Procedure Following Unproductive Frisk
If the frisk discloses nothing properly seizable, the officer nev-
ertheless may continue to detain the person while concluding his
investigation, unless 20 minutes have elapsed since the start of
the detention.
Rule 605 Returning Separable Possessions.
If the person frisked or detained is not arrested by the officer,
any objects taken from him pursuant to Rule 601(A) or Rule
602(C) should be returned to him upon completion of the frisk or
detention. However, if something occurring during the detention
has caused the officer to reasonably suspect the possibility of
harm if he returns such objects unexamined, he may briefly in-
spect the interior of the item before returning it.
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Rule 701 Prompt Recording.
A law enforcement officer who has stopped or frisked any per-
son shall, with reasonable promptness thereafter, complete (in-
sert the stop and frisk from provided in the department).
Rule 702 Stop Based on Informant's Tip.
If the stop or frisk is based in whole or in part upon an inform-
ant's tip, the officer making the stop or frisk shall make every rea-
sonable effort under the particular circumstances to obtain and
record the identity of the informant. Further, the officer shall re-
cord the facts concerning such tip, e.g., how it was received, the
basis of the informant's reliability, and the origin of the inform-
ant's information.

